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Selected Developments in California Law
Rankin v. McPherson: The Court
Handcuffs Public Employers
The United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
express themselves through conduct, speech or religious practice with-
out interference by the government.' In Rankin v. McPherson,2 the
United States Supreme Court balanced the interest of a public employee
in free speech against the interest of the government in efficiency and
discipline in the work place, holding invalid the discharge of the
employee for exercise of the right to speech.3 The Supreme Court first
considered whether statements made in a private conversation at work
are of public interest.4 If the statements are of public interest, the
Supreme Court balances the right of expression by the employee against
the need of the employer to maintain discipline in the office.5
The plaintiff in Rankin, Ardith McPherson, was summarily dis-
charged from her county computer data entry job for making a
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10
(1964) (first amendment only applicable to the states as incorporated through the fourteenth
amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (fourteenth amendment applies
only to state action). Thus, only public employees' right to free speech is constitutionally protected
from intrusion by their employers by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666;
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10.
2. 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987),
3. Id. at 2900.
4. Id. at 2896-98.
5. Id. at 2896.
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comment to a co-worker about an assassination attempt on President
Reagan. 6 McPherson sued under Title 42 United States Code, section
1983,7 for deprivation of the right to free expression guaranteed to
her by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.8 The Supreme Coit concluded that Rankin's interest in
the discipline of his office did not outweigh McPherson's rights under
the first amendment9
Part I of this Note examines the historical and legal background
leading to the Rankin decision, concentrating on the analysis used by
the Supreme Court.10 Part II summarizes the facts of Rankin and
discusses the opinion of the Supreme Court." Finally, Part III discusses
the effects and ramifications of the case.'
2
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background: 1892-1983
The initial case concerning the issue of the rights of public employees
to freedom of expression is McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.3
McAuliffe, a policeman, was terminated for soliciting campaign funds
in contravention of department regulations. 4 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts decided the issue of McAuliffe's right to be active in
politics as this right relates to the interest of the police department in
banning political activity of officers. 5 Justice Holmes stated that
6. Id. at 2895. McPherson's comment was reported differently in two of the transcripts of
the various proceedings. Id. at 2895 n.3. In essence her comment was, "I hope if they go for
him again, they get him." Id.
7. Title 42 United States Code, section 1983, provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any, citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
8. Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2895. McPherson sought reinstatement, back pay, costs and fees,
and any other equitable relief. Id.
9. Id. at 2900.
10. See infra notes 13-96 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 97-150 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 151-74.
13. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
14. McAuliffe, 155 Mass. at 217, 29 N.E. at 517.
15. Id.
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McAuliffe had a constitutional right to "talk politics," but had to
forfeit his job to exercise that right.16 On the basis of the McAuliffe
decision, until the mid-twentieth centutry courts have treated public
employment as a privilege, requiring forfeiture of first amendment
rights by the employee.'
7
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States Supreme Court began
favoring protection of free expression by public employees. A pro-
gression of decisions reversed the philosophy of the McAuliffe Court. 9
In 1952, the Supreme Court in Wieman v. UpdegraffP protected public
workers against restricted employment opportunities due to their po-
litical beliefs. 2' In Wieman, college faculty members refused to take
an oath of loyalty as required by a state act. The Supreme Court
16. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-1S.
17. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding a statute that
barred Civil Service employment for expression of political views or membership in organizations
advocating the violent overthrow of the United States government); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951) (affirming the decision of the city to deny employment to those
who refused to take an oath of loyalty); United Pub. Workers of Am., C.l.O. v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 93 (1947) (ruling that Civil Service employees may be barred from participation in
political management and political campaigns by the Hatch Act); United States v. Wurzbach,
280 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1930) (holding government employees subject to criminal prosecution for
directly or indirectly soliciting political contributions); see generally Dev. in the Law-Public
Employment, 97 HAIv. L. REv. 1611, 1756 (1984) [hereinafter Developmentsf (tracing the origin
and developments of the extension of first amendment rights to public employees).
18. E.g., Developments, supra note 17, at 1756.
19. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291 (1961) (protecting individuals from criminal
prosecution based solely on membership in political organizations). John Noto was convicted of
violating the Smith Act which imposes criminal sanctions for knowingly maintaining membership
in a political organization that advocated overthrow of the government. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §
2385 (1982). The United States Supreme Court reversed Noto's conviction ruling that one who
is in sympathy with the legitimate goals of the organization but who does not personally advocate
violent overthrow cannot be convicted. Noto, 367 U.S. at 299-300; see Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (holding that the state could not condition employment on oaths of political
fidelity). Elfbrandt extended protection against discrimination due to political affiliations to public
employees five years after Noto. Id. at 19. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963)
(deciding that the state could not discharge and deny workers' compensation privileges on the
basis of religion). Sherbert involved an employee who was terminated and denied compensation
for not working on a religious holiday, Id. at 399. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964) (ruling criticism of the government officials protected by first amendment
unless statements made with knowing or reckless disregard of the truth); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (despite contrary state law, United States Constitution protects
accusations by district attorney that local judges are lazy and inefficient). In deciding New York
Times and Garrison, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Constitution was intended to protect
and encourage energetic discussion and criticism of the government. New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 269-71 (establishing "actual malice" standard in libel cases criticizing government officials);
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75 (reestablishing that speech concerning public affairs is the essence
of self-government).
20. 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (holding that the state could not condition employment on an oath
of office requiring ienunciation of specified political beliefs).
21. Id. at 191.
22. Id. at 185.
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held that the act was an indiscriminate assertion of state power which
stifled democratic expression.Y In the 1967 decision, Keyishian v.
Board of Regents,2 the Supreme Court invalidated two New York
statutesz conditioning public employment on unreasonable restrictions
of first amendment rights of employees.2 The Supreme Court held
that academic freedom was a special concern of the first amendment
and laws that curtailed the open exchange of ideas could not be
tolerated.21 By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court protected most
political speech.21
The cases leading up to Pickering v. Board of Education29 thawed
the chill on freedom of expression established by McAuliffe. 0 The
Supreme Court used the Pickering decision to augment the first
amendment as an avenue for the exchange of ideas to promote political
and social change.3 1 In Pickering, a teacher, acting as a private citizen,
wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing support of
a tax increase by some school board administrators. 32 Additionally,
Pickering criticized the allocation of available funds between athletics
and education.3 3 The Supreme Court established a two-prong test to
analyze the competing interests of the state and the employee.3 In the
first step of the Pickering test, a court must determine if the statement
23. Id. at 191.
24. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
25. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3021 (McKinney 1981) (requiring removal of persons from the public
school system for subversive statements or acts); N.Y. Crv. Sarv. LAwv § 105 (McKinney 1983)
(requiring removal of public employees for seditious or treasonable acts or statements). See
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599. The Supreme Court held that using the
words "treasonable," "seditious," or "subversive person" without definitions was unconstitu-
tionally vague. Id.
26. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604-06 The employment contracts incorporated statutes that
prohibited advocacy of seditious doctrines. Id. at 595-96.
27. Id. at 603.
28. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (1967) (advocacy of political doctrine); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (oaths of political fidelity for public employees); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (criticism of public officials); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269-71 (1964) (criticism of public officials); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963)
(religion); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961) (membership in political organi-
zations); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (political beliefs).
29. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
30. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983) (Pickering and its antecedents prevent
government from chilling expression by public employees through fear of discharge).
31. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72 (ruling that teachers as a class must be able to speak
out without fear of retaliatory dismissal).
32. Id. at 566.
33. Id.
34. Id, at 568, 569-70. The balance test developed by the Supreme Court in Pickering
involves two parts: first, the court determines whether the content of the speech is of public
concern and second, if the speech is a matter of public concern, the employee's right is balanced
against the interest in efficiency of the employer. Id.
1546
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of the employee is a matter of public concern. If the speech is classified
as a matter of public concern, the right of the employee to free
expression is balanced against the interest of the employer in main-
taining efficiency and discipline in the work environment. 5 The Su-
preme Court held that the topics commented on by Pickering were
matters of public concern, noting that open expression was "vital" to
a well-informed electorate. 6 The Supreme Court further held that in
the absence of knowingly false statements and opinions by Pickering,
statements on issues of public importance could not serve as a basis
for his discharge from public employment.3 7
B. Modern Analyses of the First Amendment Rights of Public
Employees
By 1983, when Connick v. Myers35  was decided, communications
by public employees as citizens, 39 public actions by public employees,
40
and private communications between employee and employer were
protected by the Supreme Court.4 1 Connick came about when Sheila
Myers, an assistant district attorney, refused to accept a transfer from
the probationer counselling program to the criminal prosecution de-
partment.4 2 Due to her current counselling assignment, Myers felt the
transfer would cause a conflict of interest by forcing her to prosecute
repeat offenders whom she had previously counselled, thereby com-
promising her effectiveness .43 Ultimately, Myers circulated a question-
naire within the office challenging transfer rules and general office
policies regarding management and special assignments. 44 As a result
of the mini-insurrection, Myers was terminated for refusing to accept
the transfer, interfering with the efficient functioning and morale of
35. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
36. Id. at 571-72,
37. Id. at 573-74,
38. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
39. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (protecting the testimony of a Texas
State College teacher before state legislature on upgrading a junior college to a four year
institution).
40. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282-83 (1977)
(public school teacher not rehired for giving a memorandum regarding teachers' dress code to a
radio station).
41. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (school
teacher not rehired for combative private conversations between herself and the school principal).
42. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 n.l. Myers had been employed by the District Attorney's
office for five and one-half years. Id. at 140.
43. Id. at 140 n.1.
44. Id. at 141.
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the office, and damaging the authority of the District Attorney. 45
In deciding Connick, the Supreme Court added refinements to the
Pickering balancing test by permitting additional constraints on ex-
pression by public employees. The Supreme Court held that when
close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsi-
bilities, a wide degree of deference to the judgment of the employer
is appropriate.4 The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that a stronger
showing by the government may be necessary to justify the termination
when the speech of the employee substantially involves matters of
public concern.47 Moreover, the Supreme Court established that greater
weight should be accorded to the employer in regulating speech when
the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the
office.4
The Supreme Court found that one question on Myers' questionnaire
touched on a matter of public concern.49 Thus, Myers' expression
satisfied the classification prong of the Pickering test5 0 However,
Myers failed to satisfy the second condition of the Pickering test,
balancing the competing interests of the employee and employer be-
cause her questionnaire, if released to the public, could not convey
useful information to the electorate.5' Therefore, the Supreme Court
found that the expression of Myers was not protected by the first
amendment.52
Applying the balancing portion of the Pickering test, the Supreme
Court in Connick relied on the doctrine announced in Elrod v. Burns3
and extended by Branti v. Finkel.-' The Elrod/Branti doctrine predi-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151-52.
47. Id. at 152.
48. Id. at 153.
49. Id. at 149. Only Question 11 on the form, whether other assistant district attorneys
"ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates,"
satisfied the threshold requirement of "public concern" to initiate a balancing of the interests of
the parties. Id.
50. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
51. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
52. Id. at 154.
53. 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976) (ruling that a public official could not discharge nonpolicy-
making employees because they did not support his political campaign). But see Auriemma v.
City of Chicago, 601 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (1984) (holding that the Elrod/Branti doctrine not
limited to defacto dismissals); De Feliciano v. Aponte Roque, No. 86-1300 (P.R. Dec. Aug. 14,
1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (holding that demotion based on political affiliation violates
the first amendment); Messer v. Curci, 610 F. Supp. 179, 183 (1985) (Elrod/Branti doctrine,
which applies to discharge of nonpolicymaking public employees for political reasons, does not
apply to hiring of such employees).
54. 445 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1980) (holding that Assistant Public Defenders could not be
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cated the appropriateness of the discharge on whether political affili-
ation interfered with effective performance by the employee 5- The
Supreme Court stated that classification of employees as "policymak-
ing" or "confidential" was not indicative of an employee's ability to
effectively perform a job.5 6 Therefore, classification was insufficient
to determine when political affiliation was a legitimate factor relevant
to office efficiency.57 Moreover, requiring an employee to adhere to a
particular political affiliation was coercive and violative of the right
to freedom of belief and association.51 Thus, the status of the employee
within the office was no longer a factor in measuring the disruptive
impact of the employee. 9
The trend of the Supreme Court in deciding cases concerning the
protection of public employees under the first amendment is inconsis-
tentA0 In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery
County, Ohio,61 a high school teacher was not rehired because she
admitted bisexual preferences. 6 Due to findings by the jury that
admissions of bisexuality by Rowland had not interfered with the
performance of her teaching duties, the district court held that ter-
mination based merely on her admissions of sexual preferences was
impermissible.63 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because'
Rowland's speech was not about a matter of public concern and,
discharged solely because of their political affiliations), Accord Visser v. Magnarelli, 530 F. Supp.
1165, 1174-75 (1982) (stating that dismissal of city clerk solely for political reasons violated first
amendment. rights). But see Whited v, Fields, 581 F. Supp, 1444, 1457 (1984) (holding that a
sheriff could constitutionally replace deputies and jailers who politically opposed him but not
cooks, dispatchers, and secretaries on such grounds).
55. Branti, 445 U.S. at 519-20; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359.
56. Brani, 445 U.S. at 518.
57. Id.
58. Branti, 445 U.S. at 516-18; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355, 366, 375.
59. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 366. See Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). Justice Scalia
argues in his dissent that the distinction between policymaking and nonpolicymaking employees
is irrational. Id. at 2905. Since any employee can hurt the operation of an office, the distinction
allows nonpolicymaking employees to make remarks that would otherwise permit the employer
to discharge the employee. Id.
60. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896 (1987) (ruling that employee
could not be discharged for expressing herself, even if disruptive in the opinion of the employer)
with Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that an employer may discharge an
employee for disrupting an office if her speech is of limited first amendment interest) and
Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ruling that the discharge
of an employee for disruptive lifestyle admissions was valid).
61. 730 F.2d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (high school counselor suspended from nontenured position for admitting bisexual
orientation).
62. Id. at 454.
63. Id. at 456-58 (Special Verdicts 1, II, and III).
1549
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
therefore, not protected by the first amendment.64 Additionally, the
record did not reveal how other employees with unusual sexual pre-
ferences were treated, making an equal protection analysis unneces-
sary.61 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari,6 Justice Brennan's
dissent to the denial of a hearing indicated the strong disagreement
within the Court regarding constitutional issues and the emphasis given
the interests of the employer in maintaining moral discipline among
employees. 67 Justice Brennan argued that issues of free speech under
a Pickering analysis and equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment were recognized by the trial court and should be settled by the
Supreme Court.6 Rowland was the last case considered for hearing
by the Supreme Court. on the issue of the right to freedom of expression
for government employees prior to Rankin.
69
C. Alternative Standards of Review
The Supreme Court has not settled on one test to evaluate right to
free expression by public employees.70 In addition to the Pickering/
64. Id. at 451.
65. Id. at 450.
66. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 470 U.S. 1009
(1985).
67. Id. at 1009-18.
68. Id. at 1010-11.
69. Justice Powell, who cast the decisive vote in Rankin, took no part in the consideration
or decision. Id. at 1018. Justice Kennedy, who replaced Justice Powell, could determine the
outcome of future cases.
70. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 569-70 (1968) (creating the
"balancing test"); Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977)
(establishing the "mixed motive test"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(creating a "due process test"). See-Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599 (1967)
(applying the vagueness/overbreadth doctrines). In Keyishian, continued employment as a school
teacher was conditioned on signing an agreement that, consistent with state law, prohibited
teaching treasonable or seditious doctrines. Id. at 599. The Supreme Court held that the statutes
were unconstitutional because the undefined- words were too vague to be applied consistently by
lower courts. Id. Thus, the words had a chilling effect on exercise of the first amendment rights
by teachers and public employees. Id. at 604. Compare United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973) (holding that overbroad provisions
of the Hatch Act did not invalidate entire statute) with Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148-
55 (1974) (holding vagueness/overbreadth doctrine limited by statutory procedures). In Letter
Carriers, individual employees, the employees' union, and political party committees challenged
the constitutionality of section 9 of the Hatch Act, which prohibited federal employees from
taking an active part in political campaigns. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1982). The Supreme Court
determined that proscriptions must be set out in terms that an ordinary person using ordinary
common sense can sufficiently understand and observe. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 579-80. In
Arnett, a non-probationary employee was dismissed from his position for making disparaging
remarks about coworkers. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 136-38. The Supreme Court prescribed the limits
1550
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Connick "balance" test, two other analyses are easily applied. The
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle "mixed
motive" test, allows the employer to prove that the termination was
justified and no prohibited motive precipitated the discharge. 7' The
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth "due process" test prevents
an employer from violating the substantive or procedural due process
right of employees upon discharge. 72
1. Mt. Healthy v. Doyle: The Mixed Motive Test
The Mt. Healthy "mixed motive" test is applied in factual contexts
where the employer terminates an employee, using a protected right
of the employee coupled with some other legitimate administrative
concern as reasons for the discharge. 73 In Mt. Healthy, Doyle, a
nontenured teacher, was discharged for making an obscene hand
gesture to correct a student and making comments to a radio station
about school board dress code policies. 74 The Supreme Court found
that the school board was entitled to discharge Doyle for the gesture,
to the vagueness/overbreadth doctrines, stating that if a procedural statute necessarily excludes
protected speech from its control, it is neither vague nor overbroad. Id. at 162. See Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Louderrnill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985) (ruling that employee entitled to a
pretermination opportunity to respond and a post-termination administrative hearing established
by state law). Loudermill stated on his job application for security guard for the board of
education, that he had never been convicted of a felony. Id. at 535. The Board later found out
that Loudermill had been convicted of larceny and discharged him for dishonesty on the
application. Id. Loudermill was not allowed to challenge the termination in an administrative
hearing. Id. In rejecting Arnett, the Supreme Court held that due process provides certain
substantive rights that cannot be denied except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.
Id. at 540-41. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980), reh'g denied, 445 U.S.
972 (1980) (ruling that prepublication review of the writings of a former Central Intelligence
Agent not a violation of first amendment rights); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1147 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (holding that Central Intelligence Agency censorship of secret documents not a violation
of first amendment rights). The domestic security/prepublication approval required by Snepp and
McGehee involved refusal by the Central Intelligence Agency to allow former employees to
publish books without prior approval. Snepp, 444 U.S at 507-8, 509 n.3; McGehee, 718 F.2d at
1139. In each case the Supreme Court held approval or censorship by the Agency did not violate
the first amendment rights of the former employees. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3; McGehee, 718
F.2d at 1147.
71. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding discharge must be predicated on constitutionally
unprotected activities by the employee).
72. See 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (holding that substantive due process rights are not
violated unless property or liberty interest in the employment is possessed). See also Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (ruling that failure to provide termination hearing to
employee with an expectancy of rehire violated procedural due process).
73. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
74. Id. at 282-83.
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but the board violated his right to freedom of expression by discharging
Doyle for the comments to the radio station.75
The Supreme Court announced a two-part test requiring the dis-
charged employee to establish the protected conduct as a motivating
factor in the decision to discharge. 76 If the employee successfully
establishes that the protected conduct was a substantial factor in the
decision to terminate, the burden of proof then shifts to the public
employer to show that the decision to discharge the employee was
reached regardless of the protected conduct .77 Using the Mt. Healthy
"mixed motive" test, once the employee has established the possibility
of an improper motive for discharge, a heavy burden of proof is
placed upon the employer to show that the decision would have been
made in spite of the protected conduct.
78
2. The United States Constitution: Substantive and Procedural
Due Process Analysis
The United States Constitution guarantees immunity from depriva-
tion by government of life, liberty, and property without due process
to all persons Within the jurisdiction of the United States.79 The
application of a due process analysis to a deprivation of protected
conduct by a public employer is dependent on either a property or
liberty interest in the employment. 0 An employee can acquire a
property or liberty interest in employment through contract or by
75. Id. at 284-86.
76. Id. at 287.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The fifth amendment states in part, "No person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " See U.S. CONSr.
amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment states in part, ".... nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... " Id.
80. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (stating that a contract right
guaranteed a teacher procedural due process through a hearing after termination for criticizing
college administration); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-79 (1972)
(statutory due process rights require notice to the employee on reason for failure to rehire).
81. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 599-603 (establishing that substantive due process rights are
conferred by contract or statutory grant). See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Bishop, a police officer, terminated by the city manager due to various minor
transgressions, had a property right in his reputation and good name. Id. at 343, 348-49. The
Supreme Court, however, specifically addressed and rejected Justice Brennan's view that there
was a federal common law of property rights and almost every discharge involved a constitutionally
protected liberty interest, Id. at 349 n.14.
1552
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the grant of statutory authority. 82
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,83
decided whether an employee had a property interest in his job if he
had neither a contract nor a statutory guarantee of continued em-
ployment. Roth involved a nontenured college teacher who was not
rehired by the Board of Regents.8 Nontenured teachers discharged
midterm and tenured teachers discharged any time were given proce-
dural protection by affording them an opportunity to have a termi-
nation hearing.85 The Supreme Court held that an employee must have
a substantive property or liberty interest in employment in order for
the procedural due process of the employee to be violated. 6 Further-
more, the Supreme Court emphasized that property or liberty interests
required to create rights of procedural due process claims are deter-
mined by existing state laws or employment contracts, not by the
United States ConstitutionY Because neither state law nor Roth's
employment contract provided for the safeguards of procedural due
process, the Supreme Court determined that Roth was not entitled to
a post termination hearing."8
The companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sindermann,89 was decided
by the Supreme Court on the same dayP° Sindermann also involved
a college teacher who was not rehired for the following school year.91
Sindermann had held his teaching position for ten years. Though not
tenured, the rules and procedures of employment promulgated by state
officials gave Sindermann a de facto tenure.92 The Supreme Court
held that expectations of continued employment entitled Sindermann
to a procedural due process hearing on the reasons for his termina-
tion.93
82. E.g., CAL. ADrm'r. CODE tit. 2, § 282 (1985). Section 282 provides in relevant part, "A
limited-term employee may be separated at any time prior to the expiration of the term ...
provided, however, a limited-term employee may not be separated except for cause ....
Id.
83. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
84. Id. at 566.
85. Id. at 567.
86. Id. at 577.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 578.
89. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
90. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Both cases were argued
January 18, 1972, and decided on June 29, 1972.
91. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 594-95.
92. Id. at 602-03.
93. Id. at 603.
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Recent cases hold that employees, who could not be terminated
except for cause, possess a property interest in continued employment. 94
The substantive right afforded by contract or statute to an employee
establishes a procedural due process right to a termination hearing. 95
Thus, an employee must be afforded.procedural due process even
though the regulations of a governmental agency do not specifically
provide for a right to a hearing. 96 Consequently, should a court use
the Roth/Sindermann "due process" standard of review, the outcome
is dependent on whether substantive rights are created by contract,
statute, or custom as well as the procedures used in terminating the
employee.
II. THE CASE: RANII V. MCPHERSON
A. The Facts
Ardith McPherson, a nineteen year old black woman, was employed
by the Harris County Constable's Office as a ninety-day probationary
data entry clerk.91 Hired on January 12, 1981, she carried the title
"deputy constable" but was not authorized to carry a weapon, make
arrests, or wear a uniform.9 Her job consisted of entering information
from court documents into the constable's computer system and
occasionally answering the telephone. 99
On March 30, 1981, McPherson heard a radio newscast announcing
the attempt by John I-inckley to assassinate President Ronald Re-
agan. °0 Immediately upon hearing the news she and Lawrence Jackson,
her co-worker and boyfriend, discussed the policies of the President
94. See Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1985) (property interest in continued
employment implicated when Police Chief summarily suspended). See also Brasslett v. Cota, 761
F.2d 827, 847 (Ist Cir. 1985) (Fire Chief received procedural due process in the form of a
pretermination hearing); Fusco v. Motto, 649 F. Supp. 1486, 1489-90 (D. Conn. 1986) (permanent
employee with property interest in continued employment denied procedural due process due to
lack of pretermination hearing).
95. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547.48 (1985) (ruling that
employee entitled to a pretermination opportunity to respond and a post-termination administrative
hearing established by state law), Fusco, 649 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
96. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
97. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2894 (1987).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2894-95.
100. Id. at 2895.
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and how the policies affected black people. 10 1 During the conversation
McPherson stated that if another attempt was made on the life of
the President, she hoped the assassin would be successful. 1°2  Mc-
Pherson was unaware that another deputy constable, Captain LeVrier,
overheard her remarks. 03 LeVrier reported the statements to Constable
Rankin who immediately called McPherson to his office to explain
her comments. 104 When questioned, McPherson admitted making the
statement. 05 Following their discussion, Rankin summarily discharged
McPherson.06 The day after her discharge, McPherson attempted to
see Rankin to further discuss her discharge. 7 Rankin denied Mc-
Pherson an opportunity to plead her case in an administrative hearing
immediately following her discharge."'5
B. The Majority Opinion
A majority of the Supreme Court' 9 quickly disposed of any potential
criminal liability of McPherson for threatening the life of the President"0
or advocating the violent overthrow of the government."' The Supreme
Court held, without analysis, that McPherson's utterances were not
of a criminal nature.12 The Court began the analysis of the civil suit
brought by McPherson by stating that a public employee, terminable
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 177 n.3. (5th Cir. 1984).
104. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2895 n.5. The next day, Rankin refused to see her in order to further discuss her
termination. Id.
107. McPherson, 736 F.2d at 177 n.4.
108. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895 n.5. Rankin asserted at the first hearing in the district court
that McPherson's statement had undermined his confidence in her. Id. at 2899 n.16. The second
hearing was not precise on the issue. Id.
109. Id. at 2894. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun. Id. Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence
affirming the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
110. Title 18 United States-Code, section 871, provides in relevant part, "Whoever know-
ingly and willfully ... [makes] any threat to take the life of ... the President ... shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both." 18 US.C. §
871 (1982).
111. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2898. Title 18 United States Code, section 2385, provides in part,
"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States...
by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of [the] government; ... [sihall
be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both ... following
his conviction." 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1980).
112. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2898.
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at will, could not be discharged for exercising her constitutional right
to freedom of expression.' The Supreme Court then applied the
balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education" 4 and
refined by Connick v. Myers."5
Under the rubric of the Pickering/Connick test, the Supreme Court
first considered whether the statements of McPherson were a matter
of public concern. 16 The district court found the statements of
McPherson to be outside the area of public concern.17 The appellate
court reversed, holding that matters concerning the life or death of a
president were clearly of public concernm 8 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that remarks about
the President were of interest to the public and, therefore, plainly of
public concern.119
The Supreme Court then applied the balancing prong of the Pick-
ering/Connick test, weighing the right of the employee against the
interest of the government by examining the remarks made by Mc-
Pherson in context. 120 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, found
that statements made by a nonpolicymaking employee with minimal
public contact caused minimal disruption to the office. 2 ' Furthermore,
113. Id. at 2896. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977). The Board of Education refused to renew an annual contract due to the teacher's conduct
and statements to media concerning the Board's dress code. Id. at 281-82. The Supreme Court
held that "mixed motive" discharges were valid only if the employer would have discharged the
employee solely for the permissible motive. Id. at 284-86. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 595 (1972) (regents refused to rehire employee after public criticism of the college
administration). An employer may not discharge an employee in violation of the employee's first
and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 597-98.
114. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Supreme Court did not apply the "mixed motive" test because
Rankin did not indicate there was a reason other than the statements by McPherson for discharge.
See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895-96. The Court did not apply a "due process" analysis because
McPherson did not claim her due process rights had been violated. See id. at 2895.
115. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick refined Pickering by giving more deference to the employer
in the balance step of the analysis. Id. at 152-54.
116. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. If the statement was not of
public concern, the government officials should be given great deference in managing their offices
without the interference by courts under the guise of the first amendment. Id.
117. McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. Id.
119. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2897 (1987). The Court reviewed the entire
record from the courts below to determine if the findings were supported by the evidence. Id.
120. Id. at 2897-98; Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (private communication with employer, as opposed to public
expression of employee's views, are protected). Therefore, private remarks by McPherson are
protected by the first amendment whether to a coworker or her employer. See Rankin, 107 S.
Ct. at 2898 n.11; Glvhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4.
121. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2900. Justice Marshall did not mention that the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, was a factor in balancing
the interest of the Constable against the right of the employee. Id. at 2898-900. Constable Rankin
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the specific remarks made by McPherson did not impair the efficiency
of the office.' m Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the interest
of the state in maintaining office discipline did not outweigh the
individual right to free expression and affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeal, holding her discharge improper.'2
C. Concurrence by Justice Powell
In the view of Justice Powel, Rankin was not a complex case
because the evidence was uhdisputed. 24 Justice PoweU did not apply
the normally extensive analysis required by the Connick v. Myers test
for two reasons. First, McPherson intended her comments to be
private.'2 5 Second, the Supreme Court classified the speech of Mc-
Pherson to be a matter of public concern.2 6 Justice Powel concluded
that the employer has a difficult task in justifying punishment of
employees for the type of private speech that occurs at all levels of
the work place. 27 To Justice Powell, the likelihood of office disruption
due to a single spontaneous comment was unfathomable.'2 Thus,
Justice Powell concurred with the opinion of the Court and provided
the fifth vote affirming the appellate decision. 29
D. The Dissent
Justice Scalia, writing for the four dissenting justices, disagreed with
the majority on the application of both the classification and balancing
steps of the Pickering/Connick test.'3 0 First, relying on a string of
major first amendment decisions, Justice Scalia limited protected speech
to discourse essential to informing the electorate of political rights or
reported the incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, indicating that he was sensitive
about potential threats against the life of the President of the United States. Id. at 2898 n.12.
122. Id. at 2899.
123. Id. at 2900.






130. Id. at 2901. (Scalia, J., dissenting joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and White,
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opinions."' The dissent similarly defined speech on matters of public
interest to be speech necessary for dissemination of information to the
voting public in order to facilitate informed judgments about public
officials.112 Furthermore, protected matters of public interest must fall
squarely within the definition recognized by earlier decisions rather
than near the limits of first amendment protection. 33 By analyzing
"public concern" according to the more rigid interpretation of the
earlier cases, Justice Scalia disqualified McPherson's speech as neither
nor of public concern and, therefore, not subject to the protection of
the first amendment. 34
Second, even if the statements of McPherson were of "public
concern," the balance should favor the strong interest in office dis-
cipline of the employer. 35 The issue in Rankin was whether the interest
of the constable in preventing the expression of the statements in his
agency outweighed the right of expression by McPherson, not Rankin's
interest in discharging McPherson.136 Justice Scalia argued that the
constable had the right to admonish McPherson for her statements
and discharge was merely an intemperate extension of that right. 37
Therefore, the dissent focused on the right to make or censor speech
by both parties, not an interest in discharge balanced against a
constitutional right. 38
Third, Justice Scalia objected to classification of employees as
confidential policymakers or nonpolicymakers as a criteria in deter-
mining the disruptive value of remarks made in the work place. 39
Justice Scalia stated that any employee can hurt working relationships
131. Id. at 2902. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (stating that
free and open debate is essential to informed decisionmaking by the voters); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (holding that speech lies at the heart of the first amendment);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (ruling that matters dealing with the essence of
self-government are protected); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating
that debate must be spontaneous, energetic, and unrestrained).
132. See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2902. Justice Scalia characterized the remarks by McPherson as being only one
step removed from completely unprotected speech. Id. at 2903. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (stating that the first amendment protects advocating lawful but not
violent change of the existing order). McPherson advocated her ideas in violent terminology.
Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895. Justice Scalia, therefore, considered her speech unprotected. Id. at
2902.
134. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2904.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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regardless of job function. 14 By differentiating between employees
based on status within the office, ministerial employees are permitted
to make remarks that are antithetical to the function of the office.1
4'
If Rankin, as an employer, was entitled to reprimand McPherson for
her remarks, then Rankin was entitled to determine when those remarks
were unsuitable in the particular work situation.
42
Justice Scalia conceded that the discharge was intemperate. 4 How-
ever, Justice Scalia concluded that the statements of McPherson were
not of public concern and failed the threshold requirement of the
Pickering/Connick test.' 44 Furthermore, even if the remarks were of
public concern, the remarks were not squarely within the parameters
protected by the first amendment. 45 Moreover, Rankin had adequate
reason to discipline McPherson for her remarks in order to maintain
both the esprit de corp and the public image of the office.' 46 Therefore,
the remarks of McPherson failed to fulfill the criteria of the balancing
prong of the Pickering/Connick test. 47
Lastly, Justice Scalia stated that the Supreme Court is the wrong
forum for adjudging administrative matters relating to the severity of
discipline.' 4' The role of the Supreme Court is not to act as a panel
to develop principles for state civil service administrators. 49 Therefore,
Justice Scalia, as an additional rationale for his dissent, would hold
that the Supreme Court is the wrong forum to determine if Rankin
was justified in discharging McPherson for her remarks.Y0
III. RAvIFICATIONS
Rankin v. McPherson broadens the scope of speech classified as




143. Id. at 2904.
144. Id. at 2902.
145. Id. at 2904-05.
146. Id. at 2905.
147. Id. at 2905-06.
148. Id. at 2905.
149. Id. at 2904.
150. Id. at 2905.
151. Compare Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897 (life and death of the President are matters of
public concern) with Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (questionnaire must be of
public import in evaluating the District Attorney as an elected official) and First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (matters of public concern lie at the heart of first amendment
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majority adopts the standard used by the court of appeals, equating
statements of general public interest with statements of public political
concern. 152 The "public interest" standard'5 3 extends the protective
umbrella of the first amendment, forcing an ad hoc determination of
what infonation is vital to self-government.1 4 The Rankin decision
also affects some circuit courts of appeal that use a standard that is
similar to the position of the dissent, requiring statements to concern
information needed by members of the electorate in order to make
informed decisions about the operation of their government.'" The
result of Rankin v. McPherson is to broaden the scope of the cases
that fulfill the "public concern" portion of the Pickering/Connick
test by including any topics that interest the public.1
6
To avoid the expanded first amendment protection afforded by
Rankin, similar fact patterns might be approached using an analysis
other than the Pickering/Connick balance test. Using a "mixed mo-
tive" test, discharge of an employee is justified only if the termination
is not substantially based on protected conduct.5 7 Similarly, additional
facts, like contractual and statutory safeguards, as well as the proce-
dures followed by the employer in discharging the employee, are
required for a due process analysis.'
protection) and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (matters of public
concern are those vital to an informed electorate) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-
75 (1964) (stating that free and open debate are vital to informed decisionmaking by the public).
152. See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897.
153. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1971) (expanding knowing-
or-reckless-disregard standard from Times v. Sullivan to include any matter of public or general
interest). But see Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 755-56 (1985) (stating
that Gertz supplanted Rosenbloom); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (test for
public concern "determined by content, form and context... as revealed by the whole record.");
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (ruling that general or public interest not
sufficient to require Times standard).
154. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47.
155. See, e.g., Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that speech is of
public concern only if it has relevance to public evaluation of government performance) and
McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that speech must
concern issues of public information).
156. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2904 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
157. Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (employer
must have an administrative reason that independently justifies the termination in order to
prevail). Accord Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896 (majority applied holding of Mt. Healthy to
probationary employees). Since Constable Rankin discharged McPherson for the statements alone
and not for any deficiency in her performance, a similar result using either the Pickering balance
or Mt. Healthy mixed motive tests is anticipated. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2899 n.14.
158. Compare Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985) (holding
that an employee was entitled to procedural due process in the form of pretermination and post
termination hearings as provided by statute) and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976)
(holding that an employee must have a property or liberty interest in the employment to afford
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The concurrence by Justice Powell severely undermined the balancing
prong of the Pickering/Connick test.,5 9 Justice Powell stated 'hat the
threshold criteria determining the remarks as being of public concern
is the primary issue for determination. 160 Once speech is classified as
being of public concern, only an unusual case will justify the legitlinate
interests of an employer.' 61 Justice Powell effectively established a
higher burden of proof on the government by stressing the classification
step of the Pickering test almost to the exclusion of the balance
portion. Therefore, in establishing a higher level of scrutiny, Justice
Powell emasculated the balancing step of the Pickering/Connick test.
The impact of Justice Powell's opinion on the Rankin decision is
magnified if Rankin is viewed as a four-four split with a concurrence, 62
Significantly, the membership of the Supreme Court has changed since
Rankin was decided. 63 Justice Powell retired and Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy from the Ninth Circuit filled the vacancy. During his tenure
on the appellate bench, Justice Kennedy decided one case, Kotwica v.
City of Tucson, 64 that may foreshadow his response to future cases
similar to Rankin.
In Kotwica, a city recreation superisor violated an agreement with
her supervisor by granting an interview to the news media in which
she criticized department policies. 65 Justice Kennedy held that the first
amendment does not provide absolute protection to government em-
a procedural due process right) with Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 y. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 894-99 (1961) (federal government summarily discharged cook from military
installation for security reasons without a hearing). Id. at 894-99. The Cafeteria Workers exception
may be limited to special circumstances of governmental security, but might allow a "security"
argument in cases involving officers of the law. But see Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891,
2898 (1987) (potential breach of security due to employee statements not sufficient for discharge).
Rankin stated that his office had been requested in the past to guard various dignitaries visiting
Houston. Id. at 2894 n.2. However, over 80% of the Constable's budget was used for service
of civil process and execution of mental health warrants. Id. at 2984 n.1. In Rankin, McPherson
responded to direct questions from Constable Rankin during a short hearing immediately after
the statements were made. Id. at 2895. McPherson was denied the opportunity to defend herself
in a post termination hearing at any time after her discharge. Id. at 2895"n.5. Because McPherson
was given a cursory pretermination hearing by Rankin, the Supreme Court might have concluded
that the discharge of McPherson did not violate due process.
159. See Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2900-01 (Powell, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2901.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2894.
163. Id. at 2894. On June 24, 1987, the Supreme Court consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, Powell, White, O'Connor, and Scalia.
164. See Kotwica v. City of Tucson, 801 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) (city recreation
supervisor was suspended for making statements in an interview contradicting department policy
in violation of an agreement with a superior).
165. Id. at 1183.
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ployees who violate the express directions of their supervisors.'6 How-
ever, Justice Kennedy stated that the holding in Kotwica is limited to
the specific facts presented. 67 Despite an apparent alignment with the
dissent in Rankin, future decisions by Justice Kennedy may be fact
bound, making a pure doctrinal prediction impossible.
Finally, the Rankin Court resurrected the policymaking/nonpolicy-
making employee categories, first established in Elrod v. Burns,' to
evaluate the probable impact of speech on the work environment.'69
The majority in Rankin concluded that a low level ministerial employee
has minimal impact on the working environment, and the possibility
of disruption from remarks made by the employee are negligible.
70
However, as the dissent pointed out, the assertion of the majority
that a clerk has minimal impact on an office is contrary to reason
and experience. 71 The Connick decision illustrates the position of the
Supreme Court on the policymaking distinction prior to Rankin. 72
Myers, a nonpolicymaking employee, sufficiently disrupted the District
Attorney's office to justify her discharge using the Pickering balance
test. 73 Resurrection of the policymaking distinction effectively grants
low level employees immunity from discipline, undermining working
relations within an organization. 74
IV. CONCLUSION
The parties in Rankin v. McPherson constitutionalized a basic
termination dispute between a public employee and her employer.' 75
Notwithstanding the apparent trend of the courts in the past, 76 the
case establishes the new limit in the law of first amendment public
employee jurisprudence. By expanding the definition of "matters of
166. Id. at 1185.
167. Id.
168. 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
169. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2900 (1987).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2905.
172. Connick v. Myers, 416 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2904-05 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
173. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
174. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2905.
175. Id. at 2900-01. Justice Powell noted, "It is not easy to understand how this case has
assumed constitutional dimensions and reached the Supreme Court of the United States." Id.
176. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52. (expanding the deference shown to the government in
the balance portion of the Pickering test); see also Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir.
1987) (same).
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public concern," the Supreme Court retreats from a position favoring
employers established by Connick v. Myers.
In light of the unique set of circumstances presented in Rankin, the
change in the makeup of the Supreme Court, and the long and troubled
route of Rankin through the court system leading to the Supreme
Court, the long term judicial effects of the majority opinion in Rankin
may be negligible. However, Justice Powell's strong language upsetting
the balancing mechanism of the Pickering test may change the level
of scrutiny the Supreme Court applies to future cases like Rankin.
Furthermore, Rankin should serve unequivocal notice to public ad-
ministrators that the courts will not tolerate retaliatory treatment for
the utterance of unappealing remarks made by employees. On a more
pragmatic level, suits like Rankin might be avoided altogether by a
more sensitive approach to employee relations at the local administra-
tive level.
Richard M. Glovin
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